Prof. David Instone-Brewer's Response to
My "Divorce and Remarriage-After-Divorce in Jesus and Paul" and My
Rejoinder
by Robert
A. J. Gagnon, Ph.D.
Pittsburgh
Theological Seminary, gagnon@pts.edu
Prof.
Dr. David Instone-Brewer
For a pdf version of this article go
here.
May 2014
To the reader: This is a letter that I received from
Prof. David Instone-Brewer in response to my online assessment of his
views on divorce and remarriage. He has requested a few times over a
year-and-a-half that I post this response (which I regard as a
respectful and friendly response). I procrastinated. I suspect that part
of the reason for my procrastination was that I knew that I would need
to correct some of David’s statements and provide further clarification;
and that doing so might embroil us in an extended public debate, which I
was reluctant to do given other things on my plate and my high regard
for David. He has been very patient with me. Having received a reminder
today, I herewith post his response with my comments. After each
paragraph from David’s communication I have added a short rejoinder in
brackets and dark blue color.—Robert A. J. Gagnon (5/8/14)
29 Sept 2012
Cambridge, UK
Dear Robert.
Thank you so much for interacting with my views in this
detailed and biblical way. You identify three problems:
[I]
First you contrast Jesus with Paul. Jesus says that any
woman who remarries after an invalid divorce is committing adultery
-
whether or not she was the guilty party. This contrasts
with my interpretation that Paul allows someone who has been deserted (ie
divorced against their will) to remarry.
In my
Divorce and Remarriage in
the Bible
I
point out that Jesus is speaking in a rhetorical way about adultery.
Matthew recognizes this when he says that remarriage and unlawful lust
are both adulterous, just as anger is murderous. Matthew doesn’t say
that these murderers should be executed, nor that these adulterers
should be punished. Matthew’s context clearly shows that this adultery
is not the same as judicial adultery
–
it is a rhetorical devise to show how serious it is to
divorce someone without biblical grounds, or to lust after someone you
are not married to.
[RG: David, thanks
for these comments. My response to you in note 7 of my online article, “Divorce
and Remarriage-After-Divorce in Jesus and Paul: A Response to David
Instone-Brewer”
still holds. Let me begin by clarifying a point: I don’t claim that
Jesus regarded adultery of the heart (Matt 5:27-28) as serious as an
adultery executed bodily. Yet it is still to be regarded as a lesser
form of adultery and so something not permitted and not blessed by the
church (note that you believe that the church should allow and bless
remarriages after divorce). Adultery of the heart is not as serious an
offense as adultery not only of heart but also of body. For example,
adultery of the heart is not serious enough to justify divorce of a
spouse who has committed it; otherwise all wives would be justified in
divorcing their husbands. But it is serious enough to be warned not to
do, even to the point that Matthew appends to this Jesus saying another
Jesus saying about it being better to go into heaven maimed than to be
thrown into hell full-bodied (Matt 5:29-30). Because remarriage after
divorce is an offense not only of the mind but also of the body (and
therefore a more overt and drastic crossing of boundaries) Jesus
undoubtedly viewed it as more severe than adultery of the heart but, in
the case of a woman divorced not on grounds of adultery, less severe
than adultery committed while still having sexual relations with one’s
wife. (In circumstances where a person remarries after initiating a
divorce without “cause,” remarriage after divorce is probably every bit
as serious as regular adultery.) But remarriage after divorce in the
lesser-adultery sense is still prohibited and not “allowed” by God. If
Jesus asserts that it is sinful (i.e., tantamount to adultery, though of
a lesser degree) for a man to marry even an unjustly divorced woman and
for even an invalidly divorced woman to remarry, what else could his
point be but that a man should not marry a divorced woman of any kind
and a divorced woman of any kind should not remarry?
[I agree that Matthew is not
saying that those who remarry after divorce should be “punished,” if by
“punished” one understands “punished by the state.” Yet at the same time
I don’t think that Matthew is arguing that even adultery before divorce
should be punished by the state (just as Jesus in John 8 rejects the
imposition of capital sentencing on the adulterous woman). I do believe
that Matthew regards remarriage after divorce, like ‘regular’ adultery,
as impermissible within the church. There are a number of reasons for
this. (1) Matthew’s inclusion of an exception clause in both 5:32 and
19:9 suggests a halakhic (not haggadic) mode. The idea of an exception
clause works only on the supposition that, sans the exception, the act
in question is not permissible. (2) The Q parallel to Matt 5:31-32 in
Luke 16:16 confirms this. The context indicates that Luke did not treat
the Q saying as a piece of exaggerated sermonizing but rather as a
ruling by Jesus that safeguards the sanctity of God’s law against human
efforts at self-serving manipulation. (3) A comparison of Matt 5:31-32
with Jesus’ remarks about divorce in Mark 10:2-12 par. Matt 19:3-12 also
adds confirmation. The context there too is more a halakhic (legal)
debate than a haggadic or sermonic message. Jesus was responding to a
question of the Pharisees as to whether “it was permissible for a man to
divorce his wife.” Jesus’ response to this halakhic dispute was, in a
word, a halakhic “No”: “A person must not separate what God joined.” (4)
That this is how Matthew understood it is further confirmed by the
response of the disciples in Matt 19:10: “The disciples say to him, ‘If
the case of a man with his wife is like this [i.e., if a man cannot
divorce his wife], it is not expedient to marry.’” The protasis
(if-clause) of their conditional sentence indicates clearly that they
understood Jesus as forbidding his disciples from divorcing a spouse and
remarrying. In Jesus’ ensuing remarks, he does not correct the protasis
of their conditional sentence but only the apodosis (the then-clause).
In effect, they are right in concluding that even in a difficult
marriage Jesus’ followers do not have the option of divorce and
remarriage. For that reason they conclude that it is “not expedient to
marry” because a husband would be stuck lifelong with a very difficult
wife.
[Even your Eerdmans book appears
to give quasi-legal status in the church to Jesus’ pronouncements about
divorce and remarriage. For example, on p. 183: "Presumably those who
became followers of Jesus after an invalid divorce had to recognize that
their previous marriage was technically still legal. They could either
return to their partner or remain single. If they had remarried they
would presumably have to free the woman and return her dowry, as a Jew
did after committing technical adultery. . . . Similarly, if followers
of Jesus became invalidly divorced against their will by partners who
were not followers, they too had to try to return to their previous
partner or remain single.”]
[II]
[DIB:] The second ‘problem’ you identify isn’t a
really a problem - it is just a disagreement. You say that Jesus
overturned a ‘loophole’ created by Moses - that men can divorce women
who commit adultery. I regard the whole of the Law of Moses as being
equally inspired. I don’t see any reason to identify some laws as
inferior ideas inserted by Moses. The question is whether this law of
God was only for ancient Jews and not for Christians.
[RG: David, I just don’t see how you can sustain
the comment above since you yourself contend in your book Divorce and
Remarriage in the Bible (Eerdmans, 2002) that Jesus effectively
abrogates polygamy, which as you know OT law allows for men. Obviously,
then, Jesus did not “regard the whole of the Law of Moses as being
equally inspired” and nor do you. I quote from your book: “Jesus …
stated his belief in monogamy, which meant that a man had to be validly
divorced before he could remarry…. Jesus was making the point very
strongly. He was saying not only that polygamy was immoral but that it
was illegal” (p. 151). Similarly, on pp. 178-79 you list “six specific
things” that Jesus taught with his remarks on divorce and remarriage,
one of which is: “an individual can be married to only one person at a
time…. polygamy was no longer permitted.” If that is not overturning a
loophole given in the law of Moses to men but not to women, I don’t know
what a loophole is. I also contend that Jesus’ “hardness of heart”
remark makes this very point, namely that the Mosaic permission for men
to divorce was a concession to male passions that God was now revoking.
You see that text differently but I explain why I think your view of it
is not sustainable exegetically (see below). But regardless of your
interpretation of that phrase, your own writing about Jesus’ stance on
polygamy indicates that you view (or once viewed) polygamy law in the OT
as a loophole in God’s creation will that Moses gave to men but that
Jesus closed with his statements on divorce and remarriage. I suppose
that you could now deny that Jesus was forbidding implicitly polygamy,
taking back your earlier remarks. Yet even if you did that (and I doubt
that you would ever do so), I could still cite command after command in
OT law that clearly does not carry the same eternal and universal
significance as some other commands in the OT.]
[DIB:] When Jesus said divorce was permitted “for
your hardness of heart” I understand this as meaning: “for MY hardness
of heart”. Jesus is speaking to me, and not just to the Pharisees. I
don’t think ancient Jews suffered from stubborn sinfulness any more than
I do. I am just as capable of persistent adultery as any ancient Jew,
and I do not see any evidence that Jesus wanted less protection for my
wife than for theirs.
[RG: David, I don’t contend that “ancient Jews
suffered from stubborn sinfulness … more than I do” so your objection
here is not relevant. See note 9 in my online article. Where we differ
on the meaning of Jesus’ statement, “with a view to your hardness of
heart [Moses] wrote to you this command [permitting you to divorce your
wife],” is over whether it refers to (1) the one doing the divorcing (so
me and virtually all other scholars, excepting you) or (2) the one whose
unrepentant infidelities necessitate the divorce (so you). The immediate
context for the statement strongly supports the view that the “your”
refers to husbands who divorce their wife, given the following two
second-person plurals (“Moses permitted you to divorce your wives”), not
to the wives who are impenitently adulterous. As I state in note 9:
“Jesus is clearly addressing men throughout [Matt] 19:3-9. A better Old
Testament parallel than Jer 4:4 [which you, David, latch onto], then, is
Mal 2:14, which refers, just before a possible allusion to Gen 2:24, to
‘the wife of your youth, to whom you have been faithless [in divorcing
her], though she is your companion and your wife by covenant.’ ‘Your
hardheartedness’ in Matt 19:8 par. Mark 10:5 refers to husbands who
stubbornly persist in the evil of divorcing their wives…, thereby
rebelling against God’s will for marital permanence established at
creation.” I don’t recognize in my own comments the contrast that you
allege between my position and your own.]
[III]
[DIB:] The third problem is based on a
misunderstanding. You point out that Paul tells the woman in 1Cor.
7:10-11 to remain unmarried and attempt reconciliation with her husband,
and you complain that I make a general case out of this. I certainly do
not - I regard this as a specific case.
I point out in my book that this
case stands out in 1Cor.7 because all of Paul’s examples in that chapter
give equal weight to men and women. This is even to the point of
repetition, e.g. v.2-3 “each man should have sexual relations with his
own wife, and each woman with her own husband; the husband should fulfil
his marital duty to his wife, and likewise the wife to her husband.”
(see other examples in v.4, 12-13; 14, 15, 16, 27-28, 32-34). This is
contrasted in v.10-11, where he refers to this woman without referring
to an equivalent man. This woman separated from her husband (i.e. in
Roman law she divorced him) and Paul points out that Jesus taught
against such divorces. This has all the hallmarks of a specific case, so
the Corinthians knew the individual circumstances, just like the man who
was sleeping with his mother (1Cor.5.1).
[RG: David, this too misunderstands my remarks,
here to a point where it is the exact opposite of what you claim. You
allege that I complain that you “make a general case out of” the
provision in 1 Cor 7:10-11, implying that I make a specific case out of
it, and insist: “I certainly do not—I regard this as a specific case.”
As it is, I specifically state that I, not you, regard it as a general
case and that you regard it as a specific case. I quote from my remarks
on p. 6 of my online article: “This parenthetical remark [in 1 Cor
7:10-11] suggests [to me, Robert Gagnon!] a general principle: a
divorced woman should not remarry anyone other than her original
husband. However, Instone-Brewer argues that Paul is referring to the
specific case [!] of Greco-Roman divorce-by-separation where neither
grounds for divorce (as in Hillelite “any matter” divorce) nor even a
divorce certificate was needed.” I don’t know how I can be any clearer.
[I also, in note 11, tell readers about your contention
regarding the absence of a complementary prohibition to men in 1 Cor
7:10-11. I wrote: “The fact that Paul speaks only about the woman not
remarrying may indicate a specific situation at Corinth where a
Christian woman has already separated from her husband (due to her
husband’s adultery?). But, if so, it does not follow that the principle
of ‘no remarriage’ is restricted to a woman who has separated from her
husband for invalid grounds, particularly since Paul is in context
referring to Jesus’ own charge and Jesus (as we have seen) appears to
reject remarriage even for women divorced on invalid grounds.”
Moreover, as I state in the main text on p. 6: “Paul nowhere indicates
such a limitation to the principle of ‘no remarriage.’ Indeed, there is
every indication in 1 Cor 7 that Paul was responding to a community
predisposed to abstain from sexual relations in marriage (7:1-7), break
engagements (7:25-28, 36-38), and even dissolve existing marriages
(7:12-16). Paul had to have known that an unqualified statement about
divorced spouses ‘remaining unmarried’ would have been construed by the
Corinthians as just that: unqualified.”]
[DIB:] You have further problems with my
interpretation of Paul’s statement that the one who has been deserted
“is no longer enslaved” (1Cor.7.15). You think this means that they can
give up trying to be reconciled to the spouse who has already divorced
them against their will, but it doesn’t imply any freedom to remarry.
You reject my point that Jewish and Greek divorce certificates use the
language of emancipation from slavery: “You are now free to marry any
man you wish”. As you point out, Paul approves of this phrase when he
applies it to widows (v.39) but you think that Paul would not apply this
until the former spouse had died. This assumption is, of course, a
common and ancient one. I am merely pointing out that Paul could equally
mean that they are free to remarry. And I argue that for a first century
reader this is the more likely interpretation.
[RG: David, I treat your argument about 1 Cor 7:15
on pp. 6-9 of my online article. I raise two main problems with your
argument, only one of which you mention above. You rightly state that I
find odd that Paul does not use the expression “free to be married to
the one whom she wants” (which Paul applies to widows in 1 Cor 7:39)
when treating the issue in 7:15 of a Christian married to an unbeliever
who insists on dissolving the marriage. The reason that I find it “odd”
(not noted by you above) is that the Corinthians were operating on the
premise that Paul did not think that they should marry or even stay in
marriages, let alone remarry. They wouldn’t likely presuppose that
remarriage after such a dissolution was an option unless Paul spelled it
out, which he didn’t do in the letter. For this reason I say that your
view that the phrase “has not been enslaved” in 7:15 allows for
remarriage is “by no means certain.” I do, however, say that your view
has an “even chance” of being correct. Your characterization of my view
erroneously suggests that I reject any possibility that it implies
remarriage.
[Then I add a second problem
with your view, which you do not mention above: namely, that “even if
Paul meant by ‘has not been enslaved’ the possibility of remarriage…, it
is not likely that Paul extended this permission beyond marriage to an
unbeliever,” given OT “precedents for the dissolution of marriages to
pagans.” Paul’s entire argument in 7:12-16 is riddled with references
limiting application to the situation of marriage to an “unbelieving”
spouse (5 times in 7:12-15). As I note in my article, “the content of
7:12-16 gives indication that the subtext is the question: Does
marriage to an unbeliever count as a real marriage? Do the rules
that apply to a marriage between believers also apply to such a union?
…Paul’s answer to the question is a mixed one.… Paul’s remark in 7:15
about the believing spouse not being ‘enslaved in such circumstances’
is probably conditioned in part by the particular circumstance of
marriage to an unbeliever.… Paul probably knew Jesus’ statement that
even an invalidly divorced woman commits adultery when she remarries.
Indeed, he probably alludes to it in 7:11.” I conclude with these
words: “Even if the phrase ‘has not been enslaved’ in 7:15 allowed for
remarriage (by no means certain), and even if it were applicable equally
to marriage to a believer (very unlikely), the phrase still would
provide no support for a believer initiating divorce. Paul is
explicit here that a believer is not to leave a mixed marriage if the
unbelieving spouse is amenable to living in the same house (7:12-13).”]
[IV]
[DIB:] You conclude that Jesus did not allow
divorce for anything, and you doubt that “Jesus would have adopted an
exception for adultery as Matthew thought”. However, you guess that
Jesus would have regarded dangerous abuse as a criminal offence because
other rabbis did so, and that he would have allowed separation in these
circumstances (though other rabbis would have allowed divorce from the
abuser).
[RG: David, the rabbis allowed divorce in numerous
instances that Jesus would not have allowed, as you yourself admit.
Therefore, it doesn’t follow that because “other rabbis would have
allowed divorce from the abuser” that Jesus too would have done so.
Indeed, since Jesus does not permit remarriage of a woman invalidly
divorced, it seems unlikely that he would have permitted anything more
than separation in the case of abuse.]
[DIB:] Both you and I agree with the general
emphasis of Jesus’ teaching on marriage: it should be lifelong, and that
when problems arise the first response should be forgiveness and
attempted reconciliation. The role of the pastor is always to try and
repair the marriage. We disagree only about Jesus’ response to
persistent breaking of marriage vows. I conclude from the biblical data
that divorce is God’s solution for this kind of hardhearted sinfulness
in both the Old and New Testaments, and that these victims can remarry.
[RG: The chasm between our positions may be a bit
larger. Your discussion of how you deal with requests for remarriage in
a church setting for all practical purposes does away with any
restrictions on remarriage after divorce since you assert that pastors
should not inquire into the circumstances of the previous divorce (p.
312). So long as the person claims to be repentant you think pastors
should be willing to officiate at a remarriage ceremony, which is likely
to include persons who have divorced invalidly or who have been divorced
on valid grounds. So in effect, in adopting your recommendations, the
church would end up having to remarry everyone, irrespective of the
validity of the divorce. Moreover, your “limited grounds” for divorce
and remarriage include “emotional neglect,” which is a category big
enough to drive a truck through, since anyone who wants a divorce can
(and usually does) claim that their emotional needs are not being met.
The practical effect of all this is that all remarriages (and any
number of them) are allowed in the church.
[DIB:] However, I concede that this interpretation
is difficult to accept because it is based on ancient Jewish legal
vocabulary which had been forgotten even by the second century, so that
it undermines centuries of church teaching.
[RG: David, your view is difficult for me to
accept not because I fail to understand “ancient Jewish legal
vocabulary” but because I feel that your application of such to the
words of Jesus and Paul does not take adequate account of the
differences between the OT and rabbinic perspectives on the one hand and
the new more rigorous approach adopted by Jesus and those who followed
his teaching on the other. I think the Church Fathers basically got this
right. I do thank you for your response and express the hope here that
iron sharpens iron. I very much appreciate your scholarship and your
contribution to the church.]
David Instone-Brewer